La contribución específica de Hans Kellner a la Nueva Filosofía de la Historia se dirige a dar cuenta del revival de la narrativa a partir de los 80 en términos de un revival de la retórica. Sus relecturas de los textos históricos, metahistóricos, literarios y filosóficos nos invitan a apreciar las estrategias retóricas implicadas en ellos, desplegando aquello que habilitan o imposibilitan decir acerca del pasado. Kellner invita a eludir el planteo fundacionista que se ciñe a la cuestión de la (...) validez epistémica del texto, sin caer por ello en la actitud determinista lingüística que fija las estrategias discursivas en tanto estructuras artificiosas y distorsivas de la realidad. Kellner nos desafía a abandonar la metáfora de la distorsión para caracterizar la relación entre representación y realidad. Si en cuanto filósofxs de la historia nos interesa trazar líneas de continuidad y comunidad en la indagación historiográfica, debemos enfocar en sus fuentes retóricas más que en la evidencia documental o la experiencia del pasado cuyo rasgo manifiesto es la fragmentariedad. Su propuesta promueve que nos focalicemos, por un lado, en las innumerables elecciones tomadas entre las diversas modalidades de conocimiento disponibles. Por el otro, nos advierte de la ansiedad provocada por dicha elección en contra de otras opciones descartadas que podrían habernos hecho pensar las cosas de otra manera. ARK: ark:/s18537960/xdxtang:n. (shrink)

Reseña bibliográfica del libro de Verónica Tozzi Thompson (comp.), _El futuro práctico de la nueva filosofía de la historia_, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2022, 446 páginas. ISBN 978-987-816-451-9.

La sensación de la imposibilidad de alcanzar la versión definitiva del pasado resulta en la urgencia a tematizar los discursos que se arrogan su representación. En respuesta a las guerras de los discursos, la filosofía de la historia en el siglo XX examina centralmente el lenguaje en el que se expre..

En "La evidencia de la experiencia" Joan Scott lanzó un desafío a las concepciones que sustentan las políticas de la identidad, de tal profundidad y agudeza, que llega incluso a cuestionar la razonabilidad de sus reclamos y la eficacia de tal política. Las reacciones no tardaron en llegar, generando múltiples intentos de responder al desafío. Se destacan entre ellos el programa Realista pospositivista de Satya Mohanty, cuyo objetivo primordial será ofrecer una consideración alternativa de la noción de experiencia subjetiva -antiesencialista (...) pero se opondrá a la disolución deconstructiva del posmodernismo. En el presente trabajo, analizaré cómo una u otra consideración puede responder más eficazmente a reclamos de legitimidad de identidades marginalizadas. In "The Evidence of Experience" Joan Scott challenged the philosophical accounts that support identity politics based on the fact that this tradition puts the razonability of the claims and the efficiency of this policies at risk. Multiples responses have been given to this argument, but the most profound and sharpest critiques were introduced by the Realist Post-positivist Programme. This theory, developed by Satya Mohanty and et al, tries to give an alternative consideration of the notion of "subjective experience"-antiessencialist but the opposite to the posmodernist deconstructive dissolution of this term. In this paper I analyze both positions and I will try to give a consideration on my own in order to offer a better and more efficient response to identity-claims. (shrink)

En el 2008 se cumplen 25 años de la aparición de Metahistoria: la imaginación histórica en el siglo XIX, punto de inflexión para la filosofía de la historia en tanto se aviene a su giro lingüístico. 2008 también es el 80 aniversario del propio Hayden White, ocasión que ha convocado a los filósofos d..

The place that Arthur Danto gives to history, as constitutive to as and our world, as well as a discipline able to produce knowledge of the past, reach its cenit with his philosophy of art. In “the End of Art”, Danto announces an end of the history of the search of the philosophical definition of art and the beginning of the era of pluralism. It is in this account where essencialism and historicism are combined in a way that estimules a (...) heat debate that continues today. In this paper, I give a reconstruction of Danto’s Philosophy of historical language in order to show why this combination is possible and which compromises that should be assumed by an authentic historicism. (shrink)

The second half of the twentieth century has been witness to a blooming of reflections on the status of historical narrative. One of the main achievements of a narrativist philosophy of history (NPH) consists of having reinforced the worth of an autonomous historical knowledge vis à vis standard conceptions of science which made history appear as underdeveloped. Although NPH does not dismiss the importance of documentary evidence, it did not produce an integrative account of both dimensions (the work of writing (...) and the work with evidence), being slave of a number of epistemological dualism. On one hand, NPH seems to remain in the representationalist paradigm in the case of evidence, while, on the other hand, it only admits pragmatic evaluation in the case of narrative discourse. In this paper, I sustain that John Dewey’s and George H. Mead’s reflections on our knowledge of the past offer NPH good reasons to assess the role that literary theory can play in reconstructing historical controversies, without neglecting the importance of empirical research. For instance, Dewey holds that historical writing is a case of the judgments produced in response to problematic research situations. By virtue of this, the meaning of judgments referred to the past (that is, historical narrations) “have a future reference and function,” and thus understanding their meaning involves displaying the consequences that follow from such judgments. Mead, for his part, has argued that by appealing to the independent reality of the past as ground for our beliefs about it, rather than contributing to the rational resolution of our historical problems, we stray towards the search of something which is by definition unattainable. As a consequence, I shall show the urgency of advancing in the development of a narrativist, pragmatistically-informed philosophy of history. My considerations will be illustrated through the analysis of a controversial case about a past event: the main plot of the memorable film The man who shot Liberty Valance, by the equally memorable John Ford. (shrink)

This paper concerns biopsychism, the position that feeling is a vital activity of all organisms or living beings. It evaluates biopsychism specifically from the perspective of the enactive conception of life and life-mind continuity. Does the enactive conception of life as fundamentally a value-constituting and value-driven process imply a conception of life as sentient of value? Although a plausible case can be made, there remains a conceptual and inferential gap between differential responsiveness to value and hedonic value or affective valence. (...) Nevertheless, the case for zoopsychism—that animals are the only sentient living beings—over biopsychism is also inconclusive. (shrink)

Several authors have made claims about the compatibility between the Free Energy Principle and theories of autopoiesis and enaction. Many see these theories as natural partners or as making similar statements about the nature of biological and cognitive systems. We critically examine these claims and identify a series of misreadings and misinterpretations of key enactive concepts. In particular, we notice a tendency to disregard the operational definition of autopoiesis and the distinction between a system’s structure and its organization. Other misreadings (...) concern the conflation of processes of self-distinction in operationally closed systems and Markov blankets. Deeper theoretical tensions underlie some of these misinterpretations. FEP assumes systems that reach a non-equilibrium steady state and are enveloped by a Markov blanket. We argue that these assumptions contradict the historicity of sense-making that is explicit in the enactive approach. Enactive concepts such as adaptivity and agency are defined in terms of the modulation of parameters and constraints of the agent-environment coupling, which entail the possibility of changes in variable and parameter sets, constraints, and in the dynamical laws affecting the system. This allows enaction to address the path-dependent diversity of human bodies and minds. We argue that these ideas are incompatible with the time invariance of non-equilibrium steady states assumed by the FEP. In addition, the enactive perspective foregrounds the enabling and constitutive roles played by the world in sense-making, agency, development. We argue that this view of transactional and constitutive relations between organisms and environments is a challenge to the FEP. Once we move beyond superficial similarities, identify misreadings, and examine the theoretical commitments of the two approaches, we reach the conclusion that far from being easily integrated, the FEP, as it stands formulated today, is in tension with the theories of autopoiesis and enaction. (shrink)

b>. Computational models of colour vision assume that the biological function of colour vision is to detect surface reflectance. Some philosophers invoke these models as a basis for 'externalism' about perceptual content (content is distal) and 'objectivism' about colour (colour is surface reflectance). In an earlier article (Thompson et al. 1992), I criticized the 'computational objectivist' position on the basis of comparative colour vision: There are fundmental differences among the colour vision of animals and these differences do not converge (...) on the detection of any single type of environmental property. David R. Hilbert (1992) has recently defended computational objectivism against my 'comparative argument;' his arguments are based on the externalist approach to perceptual content originally developed by Mohan Matthen (1988) and on the computationally inspired theory of the evolutionary basis for trichromacy developed by Roger N. Shepard (1990). The present article provides a reply to Hilbert with extensive criticism of both Matthen's and Shepard's theories. I argue that the biological function of colour vision is not to detect surface reflectance, but to provide a set of perceptual categories that can apply to objects in a stable way in a variety of conditions. Comparative research indicates that both the perceptual categories and the distal stimuli will differ according to the animal and its visual ecology; therefore externalism and objectivism must be rejected. (shrink)

This paper explores a middle way between realism and eliminativism about grounding. Grounding-talk is intelligible and useful, but it fails to pick out grounding relations that exist or obtain in reality. Instead, grounding-talk allows us to convey facts about what metaphysically explains what, and about the worldly dependence relations that give rise to those explanations.

Tomasello offers an evolutionary, palaeoanthropological account of the human origin of objects and objectivity. Husserl gives a phenomenological account of the constitution of objects by intersubjectivity. Comparing the two, I claim that Tomasello’s “naturalized” approach closely parallels Husserl’s transcendental approach.

En esta entrevista, conversamos con el Dr. Alejandro De Oto sobre las potencialidades de los estudios poscoloniales a la hora de comprender la configuración de espacios e imágenes de culto, consagrados, venerados o denostados y su vínculo con la historia, las memorias legitimadas y las subalternas, las identidades y las luchas de poder.

In this essay, I focus on two biographical works by Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir that I read as political texts: Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess and “Must We Burn Sade?”. Reading Arendt's Varnhagen and Beauvoir's “Sade” side by side illuminates their shared preoccupation with lived experience and their common political premises: the antagonism between freedom and sovereignty, and the centrality of action and constructive relations with others. My argument is that these texts constitute an original style (...) of political thinking, which I call politico-biographical hermeneutics, or reading the life of others as exercises in political theory. Politico-biographical hermeneutics, as I take it, is not a systematic methodology, but an approach to interpreting sociopolitical forces as they come to bear and are embodied and inscribed in the lived experiences, struggles, and works of representative or exemplary individuals. This approach identifies the political lessons of lived experience and supports one of the central claims of feminist philosophy, namely, that the personal and the political are not antithetical, but relational. (shrink)

Este estudio tuvo como objetivo caracterizar investigaciones sobre representaciones sociales de docentes y estudiantes acerca de la escritura en la educación superior. La revisión sistemática se efectuó siguiendo la metodología propuesta por la Declaración PRISMA. La búsqueda, que fue realizada en las bases de datos WOS, Scopus, Scielo y ERIC, permitió identificar 20 artículos entre los que predomina el enfoque cualitativo. Como elementos recurrentes se destacan la necesidad de que en la universidad se enseñe explícitamente a escribir y la persistencia (...) de representaciones, que vinculan la escritura con la evaluación. (shrink)

In this essay, I offer an interpretation of Arendt’s biography of the Jewish-German salonnière, Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess. Treating the book as a work of political theory, I develop two arguments: First, I contend that Arendt’s study lays the grounds for a political epistemology of marginality and exclusion, making her a standpoint theorist avant la lettre. Second, I argue that Arendt’s book gives us an account of the process of ‘becoming political.’ This helps complement, and to a (...) degree counter, her insistence in more widely read books that political freedom is an exclusively plural experience in the public realm. This insistence sidelines the role played by individual political consciousness in the decision to engage in action, as well as the necessary interaction between the private and the public spheres in becoming a political subject. Arendt’s biography suggests that becoming political can be facilitated by a solidary, and private encounter with the excluded other. (shrink)

The second volume of Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion emphasizes the pulsating particularities that distinguish the religions of history from one another. This volume discloses Hegel’s philosophical theology to be an open system whose concepts, as Jon Stewart points out, are no mere abstractions but principles concretely instantiated in the real world. This article first reviews key analytical notions used in investigating religions, with the notion of freedom being the most important. Next are examined two models of the (...) God-world relation that have gained significant attention in the secondary literature on Hegel: pantheism, which affirms God as the substantial power in all things, and panentheism, which affirms all things as being in God. The essay’s final portion turns to a third model of the God-world relation, pantransentheism, which affirms that all things are being transformed in God. There I offer a very abbreviated gesture towards a Hegelian pantransentheism. (shrink)

The causal closure of the physical world is assumed everywhere in physics but has little empirical support within living organisms. For the spiritual to have effects in nature, and make a difference there, the laws of physical nature would have to be modified or extended. I propose that the renormalized parameters of quantum field theory (masses and charges) are available to be varied locally in order to achieve ends in nature. This is not adding extra forces to nature but rescaling (...) the forces which already exist. We separate metric time in 4 dimensions from process time as the order of actualization of potentialities. This is to allow iterative forward and reverse steps in metric time to influence intermediate variations in the vacuum permittivities to move charged bodies towards achieve specific targets at a later time. Then mental or spiritual influx could have effects in nature, and these should be measurable in biophysics experiments. With this proposal, we see after some centuries how ‘final causes’ could once again be seen active in nature. (shrink)

In this paper, I outline the ways that reification as a pathology of what I call “cybernetic society” shapes the fundamental structures of the self and our shared social reality. Whereas the classical theory of reification was a diagnostic attempt to understand the failure of class consciousness, I believe we must push this thesis further to show how is fundamentally an ontological and not a merely cognitive or epistemic concern. By this I mean that it is a pathology of consciousness (...) as well as social praxis and, as such, infects the ontological substrates of social reality. In effect, reification is a collective rather than merely subjective phenomenon. I explore this dialectic between our subjective and social dimensions of being to show how reification actively shapes self and world. I end with a discussion of how this theory of reification as an ontological concept can be used to overcome it via what I term “ontological coherence,” or the capacity of the self to reflect dialectically on the shapes of sociality that one inhabits, opening it up to evaluative reflection and critique. (shrink)

A recurrent problem in the philosophical debates over whether there is or can be nonconceptual experience or whether all experience is conceptually structured, mediated, or dependent is the lack of a generally accepted account of what concepts are. Without a precise specification of what a concept is, the notion of nonconceptuality is equally ill defined. This problem cuts across contemporary philosophy and cognitive science as well as classical Indian philosophy, and it affects how we go about philosophically “engaging Buddhism” in (...) particular. Buddhist philosophers generally argue that our everyday experience of the world is conceptually constructed. For example, they argue that what appear to us to be stable, enduring entities possessing properties and belonging to kinds are fictions created by the imposition of concepts onto the incessant flux of momentary events. At the same time, “nonconceptual cognition” (nirvikalpa jñāna) marks the limits of conceptuality. But what precisely do “conceptual” and “nonconceptual” mean? Consider that “concept” is routinely used to translate the Sanskrit term, vikalpa; nirvikalpa is accordingly rendered as “nonconceptual.” But vikalpa has also been rendered as “imagination,” “discriminative construction,” “discursive thought,” and “discrimination.” Related terms, such as kalpanā (conceptualization/mental construction) and kalpanāpoḍha (devoid of conceptualization/mental construction), have also been rendered in various ways. Besides the question of how to translate these terms in any given Buddhist philosophical text, how should we relate them to current philosophical or cognitive scientific uses of the term “concept”? More generally, given that the relationship between the conceptual and the nonconceptual has been one of the central and recurring issues for the Buddhist philosophical tradition altogether, can Buddhist philosophy bring fresh insights to our contemporary debates about whether experience has nonconceptual content? And can contemporary philosophy and cognitive science help to illuminate or even resolve some older Buddhist philosophical controversies? (shrink)

Nursing and nursing education face a paradox whereby the world's most trusted profession seems not to trust its own students and practitioners. Much of nursing education has adopted what has been memorably described as the ‘cop shit’ approach. This is the panoply of surveillance, anti‐plagiarism and proctoring technologies that appear to be used more for policing and punishment of an inherently dishonest student body than to develop ethical and scholarly writing among future peers and colleagues. Nurses in practice may experience (...) similar levels of distrust as they face growing micromanagement and control of both their appearance and nursing practice. We propose that these practices of distrust emerge, not from malice, but rather from the omnipresent neoliberalism and managerialism that engulf almost every aspect of health and university life. Neoliberalism's success has been to reformat academia and practice to the point where such ingrained mistrust has become merely a neutral recognition of ‘the real world’. Dismantling nursing and education's ‘cop shit’ culture and replacing it with the trust and respect that the world's most trusted profession is accorded by wider society will not be easy, but it is vital for the future of nursing. (shrink)

Several paleontologists have recently challenged the explanatory adequacy of the modern synthetic theory of evolution. Their position is that, contrary to the prevailing view that evolutionary change is gradual, the fossil record manifests long periods of species stasis (equilibrium) punctuated by periods of rapid species formation. And, they argue, this punctuated equilibria pattern challenges the gradualist, adaptationist and extrapolationist assumptions of the modern synthetic theory of evolution and supports a hierarchical, non-extrapolationist (non-reductionist) view of evolution. In this paper I argue (...) that the challenge rests on an inadequate characterization of the modern synthetic theory and that, even accepting punctuated equilibria and an irreducible evolutionary hierarchy, the modern synthetic theory is adequate to explain evolutionary change at all levels of the hierarchy. (shrink)

With an intellectual autobiography by Hans J. Morgenthau.

Language defines human existence. Yet defining language is a fraught project. I use the term "language" to refer to a specific mode of information transfer. First, it is a communicative mode. By communication I mean the information transfer serves a function, that is, an activity that occurs because it has increased the evolutionary fitness of ancestors. Secondly, while all communication is governed by norms, human communication, as opposed to biological communication, is governed by norms that have evolved within the learned (...) traditions of individual cultures. The meaning of an assertion in a culture’s language is the set of commitments to which that culture holds its speakers when they utter that assertion. Syntax has appeared in recent evolution to facilitate and enrich the communicative function, but it is a secondary aspect of language. The defining characteristic of human communication, of "language," -- is its capacity to constitute meaning. (shrink)

Modern selfhood presents itself as autonomous, overcoming emotion by following cognitive, moral and linguistic norms on the basis of clear, rational principles. It is difficult to imagine how such normative creatures could have evolved from their purely biological, non-normative, primate ancestors. I offer a just-so story to make it easier to imagine this transition. Early hominins learned to cooperate by developing group identities based on tribal norms. Group identity constituted proto-selves as normative creatures. Such group identity was not based on (...) autonomous selfhood – such an explanation would be anachronistic -- but on emotional patterning. By imitation, music, dance, ritual and other emotional practices, proto-selves learned how to bind themselves to the norms of their culture. Such conformity was a transitional evolutionary stage between primates and selves. Emotion and rationality are not incompatible: even contemporary selfhood remains rooted in emotional identity. (shrink)

Four philosophers, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Dennett, and Hegel, who hold for the most part radically different philosophies, all agree on rejecting the notion of atomic entities, of “things-in-themselves,” and insist that objects only make sense – can only be what they are -- in a context.

The temporal unity of the self cannot be accounted for by the continuity of causal, factual, or contiguous relations between independently definable mental events, as proposed by Locke and Parfit. The identity of the self over time is normative: it depends on the institutional context of social rules external to the self that determine the relationship between past commitments and current responsibilities. (2005).

The self is not a metaphysical object but a mode of temporal organization unified by responsibility. Learning to be responsible constitutes the self as a self-identical entity over time. Responsibility depends on the current self interpreting previous events, attributing them to itself and thereby committing itself for the future. (2004) .

A self is a temporal unity in which responsibility for past commitments modifies how the present world is experienced and evaluated. This structure is analogous (a) to biological evolutionary changes in perception and (b) to how changes in a computer program determine how it will respond in the future. Responsibility is not an add-on to a self, but the mode of its integration over time. (Presented at Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Conference, Narrative and Understanding Persons, University of Hertfordshire, UK, (...) 2005). (shrink)

Experiences of racial discrimination can seem to be caused by one’s race, a combination of social identities, or non-social features. In other words, racial discrimination can be intersectional or attributionally ambiguous. This poses challenges for current understandings and measurement tools of racial discrimination in public health research, such as the explanation of racial health disparities. Different kinds of discriminatory experiences plausibly produce different psychological effects that mediate their negative health impacts. Thus, multiple characterizations and measurements of racial discrimination are needed. (...) As a result, I argue that racial discrimination should be a polysemous concept (with multiple meanings). (shrink)

Hegel's system is not teleological. For a philosophy to be teleological, as I shall use the term, means that it takes the basic nature of the world itself or any foundational account of that world to be defined ultimately by final causality. Such a view has, of course, long stood as the dominant model for interpreting Hegel's system. This essay argues, to the contrary, that the accounts of Teleology and Life in the Science of Logic, and more precisely their analyses (...) of what Hegel calls there subjective purpose and objective purpose, actually demonstrate this conception of teleology to be profoundly mistaken.The conventional reading of these sections is that they argue for two related claims: (1) that the means-ends relationship of extrinsic purposiveness—subjective purpose—is made possible by the intrinsic self-organizing process of intrinsic purposiveness; and (2) that intrinsic purposiveness—objective purpose—takes the basic structure of an organism, a natural purpose (Naturzweck), as its model, a model defined by final causality. I show this to be a deeply flawed interpretation. Hegel certainly shows that extrinsic purposiveness entails intrinsic purposiveness, but he does not conceive of intrinsic purposiveness, objective purpose, in terms of the final causality inherent in the model of a natural purpose. Rather, the systematic account of logical life argues that the activity of life must be understood as genus and this as a process of self-differentiation where the immanent and necessary unfolding of determinate negation itself, and itself alone, engenders the development without possessing or relating itself to any antecedent content. Hence, this austere thesis, rather than any form of final causality, is, as Hegel puts it, the truth of teleology, the nature of the absolute idea, and, as a result, Hegel's system is shown, at its very core, not to be teleological. (shrink)

I. SummaryRuth Boeker's Locke on Persons and Personal Identity is a profound treatment of Locke's views on the nature and identity of human persons. The book is divided roughly into two halves. The first half (Chapters 1–6 and 8) focuses on providing a philosophically sophisticated interpretation of Locke that engages with the most recent secondary literature. Chapter 3, for instance, includes an important contribution to scholarly debates about Locke's sortal-relative account of identity in the Essay II.xxvii.§7–8. Some (the coincidence theorists) (...) have argued that Locke's claim that there are different persistence conditions for a ‘man’ (human animal) and the ‘mass of matter’ that occupies the same spatio-temporal location as the man entails that there are two, coincident material objects. Others (the relative identity theorists) argue that Locke holds that there is ontologically one and only one material object at any spatio-temporal location—a single object that can be attributed different identity conditions when considered under different sortals. (shrink)

One important strategy for dealing with error in our methods is triangulation, or the use multiple methods to investigate the same object. Current accounts of triangulation assume that its primary function is to provide a confirmatory boost to hypotheses beyond what confirmation of each method alone could produce. Yet, researchers often use multiple methods to examine new constructs about which they are uncertain. For example, social psychologists use multiple indirect measures to provide convergent evidence about implicit attitudes, but how to (...) characterize implicit attitudes is an open question. To make sense of triangulation under uncertainty about constructs, I suggest two changes: first, triangulation can serve multiple epistemic functions, including some that are non-confirmatory, and second, researchers should assess the epistemic risk in claims about evidence and the acceptance/rejection of hypotheses. (shrink)

It has been argued that, in political theory and political practice, a concern with the distribution of economic opportunities and resources has recently been displaced by a preoccupation with the acknowledgement of cultural identities and differences. In their jointly authored book, Redistribution or Recognition?, Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth present their very different reactions to this development. While Fraser argues that redistribution and recognition are two mutually irreducible elements of an account of social justice, Honneth contends that a suitably differentiated (...) account of recognition can provide the basis of a theory of justice on its own. This article critically assesses the relative merits of these two positions by focusing on their accounts of the nature of capitalism, the sort of social theories that are needed in light of these accounts, and the moral philosophies associated with these social theories. This assessment leads to a number of conclusions about the proper relationship between recognition and redistribution in a theory of social justice. (shrink)

Kelsen advanced a sophisticated naturalist conception of intention and adumbrated a methodological strategy that would enable the transformation of the sophisticated naturalist conception of ‘intention’ into a cognizable object of legal science while simultaneously providing an explanation of the legal ‘ought’. The methodological strategy is the ‘inversion thesis’ which establishes that legal norms enable us to objectively identify and determine the ‘will’ or the intention of legal authority. Contrary to nineteenth century psychologism, Kelsen argues that it is not the case (...) that the will or the intention of the sovereign determines what the norm is, rather it is the legal ought that ‘objectifies’ the will. However, it is argued that in spite of the fact that Kelsen advanced a sophisticated account of intentional action, he fails to understand the complexities of the notion of the ‘will’, intentional action and practical reason. What does he miss in his understanding of the notion of the practical? I will advance the view that the notion of the practical or deliberative involves, both in Kant and Aristotle, the transparency condition which establishes that the agent or deliberator intentionally acts for reasons that are self-evident or transparent to him or her. It is a recalcitrant feature of the deliberative standpoint that cannot be theorised. For Aristotle, Aquinas and Anscombe the deliberative standpoint can be known through the end or goal of the intentional action as this provides the form of the action. The end is presented as a good-making characteristic. As problematic as that might be, this means that the end needs to be presented as a good-making characteristic and therefore it involves evaluation. For Kelsen, the soundness of this conception is an insurmountable obstacle to theorise the ‘ought’ and therefore the ‘will’. Yet, surprisingly and contrary to Kelsen’s own notions, I will show that Kelsen’s ‘inversion thesis’ is parasitic on Aristotle–Anscombe’s ‘ought’. (shrink)

Applying Jewish Ethics: Beyond the Rabbinic Tradition is a groundbreaking collection that introduces the reader to applied ethics and examines various social issues from contemporary and largely under-represented, Jewish ethical perspectives.

Beyond Reason and Tolerance argues that to prepare students to engage political, ethnic, and religious differences, higher education must adopt a developmental model for a formative and liberal undergraduate education as a process of growth involving empathy as well as reasoning, values as well as knowledge, and identity as well as competencies.